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YALE KAMISAR: WARRIOR SCHOLAR 
Francis A. Allen* 
My association with Yale Kamisar dates back to the 1950s. At that 
time I became aware of the interesting publications of a young faculty 
member at the University of Minnesota. The articles were well done, 
most of them dealing with the Supreme Court's notable expansion of 
constitutional doctrine relating to criminal procedure, then at full tide, 
a field in which I also was writing. In addition, Yale had published a 
remarkable article on the subject of euthanasia, impressive for the 
thoroughness of its research and the clarity and force of its argument. 
Fortunately, I decided to write to Yale and express my appreciation 
for the work he was doing. It is possible that I am the author of Yale's 
first fan letter. He responded warmly, and there began a conversation 
that has continued for almost a half-century. The interchange has been 
one of the profitable and pleasant features of my time in the law 
schools. 
To me the retirement of Yale Kamisar from the Michigan Law 
School faculty marks the end of an important epoch in American legal 
education and scholarship, an epoch in which by any definition Yale 
was a leading figure. His generation was too young to have 
participated in the Second World War, but many of its members retain 
childhood memories of it. (Not all were too young to be drafted into 
the Korean "police action," however, as Yale's own experience 
demonstrates.) Acute awareness of the Nazi holocaust was a potent 
influence in the lives of many in that generation; no doubt some could 
number members of their extended families among the Holocaust 
victims. It was not difficult for Yale and those of his contemporaries 
who as law teachers elected to work with the problems of criminal 
justice to perceive the dangers of abuse and the denial of human rights 
when governments exercise the police function; and there was 
abundant evidence that the reality and potentialities of such abuse 
were not confined to the totalitarian regimes of Europe, but, on the 
contrary, were clearly present in contemporary American society. 
Despite the fact that there were somber problems to be 
confronted, Yale and his contemporaries spent a large part of their 
careers in an invigorating atmosphere when confidence of a better 
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future came easily, and opportunities for advancing needed changes 
seemed available. The universities in the postwar world expanded 
enrollments and functions, and, as is often the case, institutional 
growth bred optimism. Most important to law teachers concerned with 
criminal justice, the Warren Court, building on foundations laid during 
the previous quarter-century, was finally making clear that the 
constitutional restraints on police and other law-enforcement 
procedures, especially in the states, were to be treated as more than 
polite fictions. The new constitutional law provided law teachers with 
occasions for exposition and analysis, and even opportunities to assist 
the courts in fashioning constitutional doctrine in theretofore 
uncharted areas. 
The conditions were favorable to the unfolding of Yale's career: a 
scholarly field which he could enthusiastically embrace combined with 
a burning ambition to gain recognition as a great legal authority. I 
cannot say what combination of genes, family influence, and childhood 
experiences fueled the ambition; but the result was a commitment to 
his fields of interest that has not often been matched. His work 
appeared to absorb his waking moments; fifteen-hour working days 
were the norm. One of my favorite stories about Yale illustrates how 
his scholarly efforts pervaded his life. On one occasion Yale informed 
me that he was reading Dostoyevsky's great novel, Crime and 
Punishment. Later when I asked what he thought of the book he 
expressed some disappointment, saying: "I didn't find one good 
quotation in it for my casebook." 
At least by the early 1960s Yale, through his efforts and innate 
ability, had become the leading commentator on constitutional 
criminal procedure, a position which he deservedly retains to this day. 
He published a stream of seminal articles that importantly influenced 
the development of constitutional doctrine. Someone who took the 
trouble to count found that Yale's work was cited more frequently in 
the Supreme Court than that of any other writer, and if the many 
citations in the lower federal and state courts, and in the works of 
other writers, are also taken into account, some conception of the 
importance of his influence can be gleaned. 
Yale might reasonably be called the "father" of the Miranda rule. 
Before the decision was handed down his voice was the most effective 
in pointing to the need for judicial regulation of pretrial interrogation 
of arrested persons, and he has been the leading defender of the rule 
in the years that followed. He has been equally persistent in his 
defense of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases. These 
issues seem never to die. As recently as the last year or so he has 
written in opposition to the efforts of those who seem committed to 
cancel the gains achieved by the Supreme Court in mid-twentieth 
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century, and has done it with the same verve and effectiveness that 
characterized his work forty years ago.1 With the changing ideological 
currents expressed in the Court in recent years, Yale no longer wields 
the same influence as in the past. But as a defender of the earlier 
advances, and by giving voice to views in danger of being submerged 
in the dominant political trends of the moment, his present role is 
hardly less important. 
Yale's scholarly output deserves much closer attention than I can 
give it here. A reader should not expect to find in his writings the 
formulation or manipulation of jurisprudential abstractions. He has 
found it unnecessary to articulate in a systematic way the values that 
underlie his work. He believes it is self-evident that any nation 
aspiring to be a free society must provide limitations, clearly stated 
and conscientiously applied, to guide and limit the government's penal 
powers. It is in the criminal process that the state brings to bear on the 
individual the most stringent sanctions at its command. Abuses here 
most clearly imperil human dignity and human freedom. Closely 
connected with this proposition is Yale's assumption that courts are 
appropriate vehicles to define and apply such limitations on the 
powers of the state. This is not because judges are peculiarly qualified 
for the task. Nor is it because the judicial process is well adapted to 
monitor the activities of law-enforcement agencies and officers; there 
are many practices greatly damaging to the integrity of the penal 
system which, by their nature, are not amenable to the judicial 
process. Resort to the courts to perform the supervisory function has 
proceeded much farther in the United States than in other western 
nations. The reason probably lies in the fact that, unlike other nations, 
we have failed to develop alternative institutions charged with the task 
of providing external administrative supervision and control of the 
police and other law-enforcement agencies. The result is that in no 
American state is there an official or agency accountable for the 
decency and efficiency of the criminal justice system as a whole. The 
elaborate body of constitutional doctrine relating to the criminal 
process may in large measure represent a response to the deficiencies 
in supervision and accountability provided by the criminal justice 
system. Yale has accepted the situation as part of the reality with 
which criminal justice scholarship must deal. 
When Yale Kamisar sits down to write, he is preparing for battle. 
His articles constitute prime examples of legal advocacy. It is an 
advocacy, however, that enlightens rather than obfuscates the issues. 
There is no inclination in Yale's work to reach a conclusion by simply 
ignoring countervailing arguments, a tendency too often revealed even 
1. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (2003). 
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in some op1mons of the Supreme Court. On the contrary, he 
conscientiously seeks out and addresses the points raised by his 
opponents, and not infrequently articulates them more effectively than 
those who originally advanced them. Despite the thunder of battle, 
Yale is able to admire the strong points made by his opponents and to 
respect able adversaries. He has himself gained the admiration of 
many of those who most strongly oppose his views. If I were asked to 
identify the article that most clearly illustrates the style and 
effectiveness of his written work, I would probably point to his essay, 
Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal 
Procedure.2 In it he protests a process in which accused persons in the 
custody of the police are deprived of meaningful protection of 
individual rights (the gatehouse), but are surrounded by all the 
safeguards of trial in the courts (the mansion), often after it is too late. 
No more effective demonstration of the need for regulation of pretrial 
criminal procedure has been made. The power of Yale's irony and 
outrage can be felt even after forty years. 
There are many other attributes of Yale's written work that 
deserve notice, but I shall mention only one of them. It is apparent 
that he takes pleasure in calling attention to the scholarly 
achievements of others in his fields of interest, and especially enjoys 
scanning the work of those who preceded him, an attribute rare in an 
ahistorical age when many younger colleagues appear to be busy 
reinventing wheels that were spinning effectively fifty or even sixty 
years ago. Yale's demonstration of the modem relevance of an article 
of the late Paul Kauper, first published in this Review in 1932, 
illustrates this generosity and industry.3 
Yale Kamisar has fully earned the right to rest on his laurels, but I 
hope that he does not take full advantage of the opportunity. He is 
badly needed at this hour. We are again passing through a dreary 
succession of events when at the first threats of insecurity we jettison 
many of our fundamental individual rights and immunities. Perhaps in 
the future, as in the past, we shall again offer our mea culpas and 
swear it must not happen again. It is a dangerous progression, and the 
voice of Kamisar needs to be heard. 
This is the happy Warrior; this is He 
That every Man in arms should wish to be.4 
2. Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal 
Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). 
3. Paul Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused - A Remedy for the Third Degree, 
30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 ( 1932), reprinted in 73 MICH. L. REV. 39 ( 1974). 
4. 1 WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, Character of the Happy Warrior, in THE POEMS 662, 664 
(J. Hayden ed., 1981). 
